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Dynamic oligopolies are examined with continuous time scales and under the assump-
tion that the demand at each time period is affected by earlier demands and consump-
tions. After the mathematical model is introduced the local asymptotical stability of
the equilibrium is examined, and then we will discuss how information delays alter
the stability conditions. We will also investigate the occurrence of a Hopf bifurcation
giving the possibility of the birth of limit cycles. Numerical examples will be shown to
illustrate the theoretical results.
RESUMEN
Dina´mica de oligopolios son examinados en escala de tiempo continuo y bajo la su-
posicio´n que la demanda en todo tiempo periodico es afectada por la demanda e
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consumo temprano. Es presentado el modelo matema´tico y examinada la estabili-
dad asinto´tica local y entonces discutiremos como la informacio´n de retrazo altera las
condiciones de estabilidad. Tambie´n investigamos el acontecimiento de bifurcacio´n de
Hofp dando la posibilidad de nacimiento de ciclos limites. Ejemplos nu´mericos son
exhibidos para ilustrar los resultados teo´ricos.
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1 Introduction
Oligopoly models are the most frequently studied subjects in the literature of mathematical eco-
nomics. The pioneering work of [3] is the basis of this field. His classical model has been extended
by many authors, including models with product differentiation, multi-product, labor-managed
oligopolies, rent-seeking games to mention a few. A comprehensive summary of single-product
models is given in [6] and their multi-product extensions are presented and discussed in [7] in-
cluding the existence and uniqueness of static equilibria and the asymptotic behavior of dynamic
oligopolies. In both static and dynamic models the inverse demand function relates the demand
and price of the same time period, however in many cases the demand for a good in one period
will have an effect on the demand and price of the goods in later time periods. In the case of
durable goods the market becomes saturated, and even in the case of non-durable goods the de-
mand for and consumption of the goods in earlier periods will lead to taste or habit formation of
consumers that will affect future demands. Intertemporal demand interaction has been considered
by many authors in analyzing international trade (see for example, [4] and [9]). More recently
[8] have developed a two-stage oligopoly and examined the existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium.
In this paper we will examine the continuous counterpart of the model of [8]. After the
dynamic model is introduced, the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium will be analyzed. We
will show that under realistic conditions the equilibrium is always locally asymptotically stable.
We will also show that this stability might be lost when the firms have only delayed information
about the outputs of the competitors and about the demand interaction.
2 The Mathematical Model
An n-firm single-product oligopoly is considered without product differentiation. Let xk be the
output of firm k and let Ck(xk) be the cost of this firm. It is assumed that the effect of market
saturation, taste and habit formation, etc. of earlier time periods are represented by a time-
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where H is a given bivariate function. It is also assumed that the price function depends on both
the total production level of the industry and Q. Hence the profit of firm k can be formulated as
Πk = xkf (xk + Sk, Q)− Ck(xk) (2.2)
where Sk =
∑
l 6=k xl. If Lk denotes the capacity limit of firm k, then 0 ≤ xk ≤ Lk and 0 ≤ Sk ≤
∑
l 6=k Ll.
The common domain of functions H and f is [0,
∑n
k=1 Lk] × R+, and the domain of the
cost function Ck is [0, Lk]. Assume that H is continuously differentiable, f and Ck are twice
continuously differentiable on their entire domains.
With any fixed values of Sk ∈ [0,
∑
l 6=k Ll] and Q ≥ 0, the best response of firm k is
Rk(Sk, Q) = arg max
0≤xk≤Lk
{xkf(xk + Sk, Q)− Ck(xk)} , (2.3)
which exists since Πk is continuous in xk and the feasible set for xk is a compact set.














for all k and feasible xk, Sk and Q.
Under these assumptions Πk is strictly concave in xk, so the best response of each firm is



















where x∗k is the unique solution of equation
f(xk + Sk, Q) + xkf
′
x(xk + Sk, Q)− C
′
k(xk) = 0 (2.5)
in interval (0, Lk).
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If we assume that at each time period each firm adjusts its output into the direction towards
its best response, then the resulting dynamism becomes
x˙k = Kk · (Rk(Sk, Q)− xk) (k = 1, 2, · · · , n), (2.6)
where Kk is the speed of adjustment of firm k, and if we add the dynamic equation (2.1) to these
differential equations, an (n + 1)-dimensional dynamic system is obtained. Clearly, x¯1, · · · , x¯n, Q¯


















for all k. The asymptotic behavior of the steady states will be examined in the next section.
3 Stability Analysis

























are equal to zero.
Otherwise these derivatives can be obtained by implicitly differentiating equation (2.5) with respect




































Assumptions (B) and (C) imply that
−1 < rk ≤ 0, (3.3)
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for all k and feasible xk, Sk and Q, then
r¯k ≤ 0. (3.4)
Notice that relations (3.3) and (3.4) hold for all interior steady states.









−K1 K1r1 · · · K1r1 K1r¯1













Knrn Knrn · · · −Kn Knr¯n
















The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 1 Assume that at the steady state, h¯ ≤ 0 and rkh¯− r¯kh > 0 for all k. Then the steady
state is locally asymptotically stable.
Proof. We will prove that the eigenvalues of J have negative real parts at the steady state. The










uk + h¯v = λv. (3.6)
Let U =
∑n
k=1 uk, then from (3.6),
hU = (λ− h¯)v.






−K1 K1r1 · · · K1r1

















Notice that this matrix is the Jacobian of continuous classical Cournot dynamics and it is well-
known that its eigenvalues have negative real parts if Kk > 0 and −1 < rk ≤ 0 for all k (see for
example, [1]). In this case the assumptions of the theorem imply that h¯ < 0, so all eigenvalues of
J have negative real parts.
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= λ− h¯ , (3.9)
since v 6= 0, otherwise (3.8) would imply that uk = 0 for all k.
Assume next that λ = A+ iB is a root of equation (3.9) with A ≥ 0. Let g(λ) denote the left
hand side of this equation. Then
Re g(λ) = Re
Kk(rkA+ r¯kh− rkh¯) + iKkrkB
A+Kk(1 + rk) + iB
=






Re (λ− h¯) = A− h¯ ≥ 0,
which is an obvious contradiction. 2
The conditions of the theorem are satisfied in the special model of [7, section 5.4] on oligopolies





xk − C ·Q
with some C > 0. In this case h = 1 and h¯ = −C, so h 6= 0 and rkh¯− r¯kh = −Crk − r¯k > 0 unless
rk = r¯k = 0.
4 The Effect of Delayed Information
In this section, we assume that the conditions of Theorem 1 hold, and the firms have only delayed
information on their own outputs as well as on the output of the rest of the industry. It is also
assumed that they have also delayed information on the value of parameter Q. A similar situation
occurs when the firms react to average past information rather than reacting to sudden market
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changes. As in [2] we assume continuously distributed time lags, and will use weighting functions
of the form















T if m ≥ 1
(4.1)
where T > 0 is a real and m ≥ 0 is an integer parameter. The main properties and the applications
of such weighting functions are discussed in detail in [2]. By replacing the delayed quantities by
their expectations, equations (2.6) become a set of Volterra-type integro-differential equations:



















w(t− s, Vk, lk)xk(s)ds
)
(1 ≤ k ≤ n) (4.2)
accompanied by equation (2.1). It is well-known that equations (4.2) are equivalent to a higher
dimensional system of ordinary differential equations, so all tools known from the stability theory
of ordinary differential equations can be used here. Linearizing equation (4.2) around the steady
state we have












w(t− s, Uk, pk)Qδ(s)ds−
∫ t
0
w(t− s, Vk, lk)xkδ(s)ds
)
(4.3)
where xkδ and Qδ are deviations of xk and Q from their steady state levels. We seek the solution
in the form xkδ(t) = uke
λt and Qδ = ve
λt, then we substitute these into equation (4.3) and let




































1 if lk = 0
lk otherwise,
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(1 + λT )
−1






if m ≥ 1.
Linearizing equation (2.1) around the steady state we have




xkδ(t) + h¯Qδ(t) (4.5)
and by substituting xkδ(t) = uke
λt and Qδ = ve





uk + (h¯− λ)v = 0. (4.6)



























ul + Ck(λ)v = 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ n). (4.7)









−A1(λ) B1(λ) · · · B1(λ) C1(λ)
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Assume first that h = 0. Then the conditions of Theorem 1 imply that h¯ < 0. The eigenvalues







−A1(λ) B1(λ) · · · B1(λ)























−A1(λ) −B1(λ), · · · ,−An(λ) −Bn(λ)
)




B1(λ), . . . , Bn(λ)
)⊤
,
this equation can be rewritten as

















= 0 . (4.10)
Therefore in this case we have to examine the locations of the roots of equations







= 1 . (4.12)
Assume next that h 6= 0 and Ak(λ) + Bk(λ) 6= 0. By introducing the new variable U =
∑n





uk − Ck(λ)v .
By combining this equation with (4.6) we have
uk =




) v , (4.13)
where we assume that the denominator is nonzero. Adding this equation for all values of k and




hCk(λ) +Bk(λ)(λ − h¯)
Ak(λ) +Bk(λ)
= λ− h¯ . (4.14)
Here we also used the fact that v 6= 0, since otherwise uk would be zero for all k from equation
(4.13), and eigenvectors must be nonzero.
Notice first that in the absence of information lags Tk = Uk = Vk = 0 for all k, and in this
special case equation (4.14) reduces to (3.9) as it should. The analysis of the roots of equations
(4.11), (4.12) and (4.14) in the general case requires the use of computer methods, however in
the case of symmetric firms and special lag structures analytic results can be obtained. Assume
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symmetric firms with identical cost functions, same initial outputs, identical time lags and speeds
of adjustment. Then the firms also have identical trajectories, Ak(λ) ≡ A(λ), Bk(λ) ≡ B(λ),
Ck(λ) ≡ C(λ) and therefore uk ≡ u. Because of this symmetry equations (4.7) and (4.6) become
(
−A(λ) + (n− 1)B(λ)
)
u+ C(λ)v = 0 (4.15)
and
nhu+ (h¯− λ)v = 0 . (4.16)
If h = 0, then from the conditions of Theorem 1 we know that h¯ < 0. Equation (4.16) implies
that in this case either λ = h¯ or v = 0. In the first case this eigenvalue is negative, which cannot
destroy stability. In the second case u 6= 0 and equation (4.15) implies that
−A(λ) + (n− 1)B(λ) = 0 . (4.17)





and by substituting this relation into equation (4.15) we get a single equation for v:
(
(








v = 0 . (4.19)
Notice that v 6= 0, otherwise from (4.18) u = 0 would follow and eigenvectors must be nonzero.
Therefore we have the following equation:
nhC(λ) + (n− 1)B(λ)(λ − h¯)−A(λ)(λ − h¯) = 0 .
Notice first that in the case of h = 0 this equation reduces to (4.17) and λ = h¯. Note next that













































= 0 . (4.20)
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4.1 No information lag
Assume first that there is no information lag. Then T = U = V = 0, and equation (4.20) specializes
as










− h¯K − nhKr¯ + (n− 1)h¯Kr
)
= 0 . (4.21)
Under the conditions of Theorem 1, all coefficients are positive. Therefore the roots have negative
real parts. We have already proved this fact in Theorem 1 in the more general case.
4.2 Time lag in Q
Assume next that there is no time lag in the outputs but there is time lag in assessing the value
of Q. Then T = V = 0, and if p = 0, then equation (4.20) becomes















− h¯K(r + 1) +Kn(rh¯− r¯h)
)
= 0 . (4.22)
Under the conditions of Theorem 1, all coefficients are positive. By applying the Routh–Hurwitz





























+ (−h¯+Kz) > 0 , (4.24)
where the leading coefficient is nonnegative and the constant term is positive.
We have to consider next the following cases:
Case 1. If h ≦ 0, then (4.24) holds for all U > 0, since all coefficients are positive.
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then the linear coefficient of (4.24) is negative. We have now the following subcases.
(A) Assume first that h¯ = 0. Then the conditions of Theorem 1 imply that r¯ < 0 and h > 0.





The stability region in the (r¯, U) space is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Stability region in the (r¯, U) space for h¯ = 0









In this case (4.24) has a real positive root U∗, and the equilibrium is locally asymptotically
stable if U 6= U∗.
If r¯ > r¯∗, then the discriminant is negative, (4.24) has no real roots, so it is satisfied for all
U , that is, the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable.
If r¯ < r¯∗, then the discriminant is positive, there are two real positive roots U∗1 < U
∗
2 , and
the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable if U < U∗1 or U > U
∗
2 . The stability region in the
(r¯, U) space is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Stability region in the (r¯, U) space for h¯ < 0
Returning to Case (A), assume that r¯ < − (Kz)
2
Knh
. Starting from a very small value of U ,





the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable. This stability is lost after crossing the critical
value. We will next prove that at the critical value a Hopf bifurcation occurs giving the possibility





(1 + UKz) + λKz + (−Knhr¯) = 0 , (4.28)
and (4.23) specializes as
Kz(1 + UKz) > −UKnhr¯ . (4.29)


















Uλ+ (1 + UKz)
)
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So we have a negative real root and a pair of pure complex roots. Select now U as the bifurcation
parameter and consider the eigenvalues as functions of U . By implicitly differentiating equation








+ 2λλ˙(1 + UKz) + λ
2




3λ2U + 2λ(1 + UKz) +Kz
.
At the critical values λ = ±iα, so
λ˙ =
±iα3 + α2Kz




(4α4U2) + 4α2(1 + UKz)2
> 0 (4.30)
so all conditions of Hopf bifurcation are satisfied.
The other case of h¯ 6= 0 can be examined in a similar way. The details are omitted. We will
however illustrate this case later in a numerical study.
4.3 Time lag in Sk
Assume next that the firms have instantaneous information about their own outputs and parameter
Q, but have only delayed information about the output of the rest of the industry. In this case
U = V = 0, and T > 0. By assuming m = 0, equation (4.20) becomes
λ(λ− h¯)(1 + λT ) + (λ− h¯)K(1 + λT )− nhKr¯(1 + λT )
− (n− 1)(λ− h¯)Kr = 0 , (4.31)





(1− h¯T + TK) + λ
(
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However, in contrast to the previous case there is no guarantee that the coefficients are all positive.
Under the conditions of Theorem 1, the cubic and quadratic coefficients are positive, the linear
coefficient is positive if
nhKT r¯ < −h¯+Kz −Kh¯T (4.32)
and the constant term is positive if
nhKr¯ < −Kh¯z . (4.33)
If these relations hold, then the Routh-Hurwitz stability criterion implies that the eigenvalues have
negative real parts if and only if
(1 − h¯T + TK)(−h¯+Kz −Kh¯T − nhKT r¯) > T (−Kh¯z − nhKr¯) (4.34)
which can be written as a quadratic inequality of T :
T
2
K(h¯−K)(h¯+ nhr¯) + T
(
(h¯−K)2 − (n− 1)K2r
)
+ (Kz − h¯) > 0 . (4.35)
We have to consider now two cases:
Case 1. If h¯ = 0, then r¯ < 0 and h > 0, so all coefficients of (4.35) are positive, so it holds for
all T > 0. Notice that in this case (4.32) and (4.33) are also satisfied, so the equilibrium is
locally asymptotically stable.
Case 2. If h¯ 6= 0, then h¯ < 0. The linear coefficient and the constant term of (4.35) are both
positive, however the sign of the quadratic coefficient is indeterminate. Therefore we have to
consider two subcases:
(A) Assume first that h¯+ nhr¯ ≦ 0. Then the quadratic coefficient is nonnegative, so (4.35)
holds for all T > 0. In this case nhKT r¯ ≦ −h¯KT , so (4.32) also holds. Assume first that
h ≧ 0, then (4.33) is also satisfied, consequently the equilibrium is locally asymptotically
stable. Assume next that h < 0, then the conditions of Theorem 1 imply that both r and h¯
are negative. Therefore
nhKr¯ ≦ −Kh¯ < −Kh¯+Kh¯(n− 1)r = −Kh¯z ,
so (4.33) also holds, and the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable again.





the quadratic coefficient of (4.35) is negative, therefore (4.35) has two real roots, one is
positive, T ∗, and the other is negative. Clearly, (4.35) holds if T < T ∗.
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We will next prove that T ∗ < T ∗∗, so this last condition is irrelevant for the local asymptotic
stability of the equilibrium. Let p(T ) denote the left hand side of (4.35), then T ∗ < T ∗∗ if






(h¯−K)2 − (n− 1)K2r
]
K(nhr¯ + h¯)
+ (Kz − h¯) < 0
which can be simplified as
(Kz − h¯)(h¯−K) + (h¯−K)2 − (n− 1)K2r +K(nhr¯ + h¯) < 0 .
This relation is equivalent to the following:
0 > zh¯+ nhr¯ = h¯− nh¯r + h¯r + nhr¯
= h¯(1 + r)− n(h¯r − hr¯)
where both terms are negative, which completes the proof.
Figure 3 shows the stability region in the (r¯, T ) space. The occurrence of Hopf bifurcation at
the critical value T ∗ can be examined in the same way as shown before, the details are omitted,
however a numerical study of his case will be presented in the next section.
5 Numerical Examples





















Ck(xk) = ckxk (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) .
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Figure 3: Stability region in the (r¯, T ) space for h < 0
In this case the best response of firm k is
Rk(Sk, Q) =
−Sk − βQ+A− ck
2
.
We also assume that Kk ≡ K and ck ≡ c. It is easy to see that
h = 1, h¯ = −α, r = −
1
2











Assume U > 0, T = V = 0 as in subsection 4.2. From case 2(B) we know that the equilibrium is

















If r¯ = r¯∗, then it is locally asymptotically stable if










and if r¯ < r¯
∗
, then the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable if U < U
∗







2 are the positive roots of the left hand side of (4.24).
We have selected the numerical values A = 25, c = 5, α = K =
1
100 and n = 3. In this case
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so the critical values are
U
∗
1 ≈ 4.564 and U
∗
2 ≈ 1095.436 .
In Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 we have illustrated this phenomenon. Figure 4 shows a shrinking
cycle with U = 3. Figure 5 shows the complete limit cycle with U = U∗1 , and Figure 6 illustrates
an expanding cycle with U = 6.
Figure 4: Shrinking cycle
We will next illustrate a model with delay in the output of the rest of the industry as in
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Figure 5: Complete cycle
with positive γ and α. Assume also that Kk ≡ K, the price function and the cost functions are
the same as in the previous case, so we have
h = −γ, h¯ = −α, r = −
1
2




and so z =
n+1
2 as before.





















In this case T
∗
is the positive solution of equation





We have selected the numerical values A = 25, ck = 5,α = K = γ =
1
10 and n = 3. The value




3 , so for the sake of simplicity we have chosen β = 1. Then the
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37) ≈ 55.4138 .
With this critical value a complete limit cycle is obtained, if T < T ∗ then the limit cycle changes
to a shrinking one and if T > T ∗ it becomes an expanding cycle. The resulting figures are very
similar to those presented in the previous case, so they are not shown here.
6 Conclusions
In this paper dynamic oligopolies were examined with continuous time scales and intertemporal de-
mand interaction. The effect of earlier demands and consumptions were modelled by introducing an
additional state variable, and in an n-firm oligopoly this concept resulted in an (n+1)-dimensional
continuous system.
The local asymptotical stability of the equilibrium has been proved under general conditions.
This stability however might be lost if the firms have only delayed information on the demand
interaction, on their own outputs and also on the outputs of the competitors. By assuming con-
tinuously distributed time lags stability conditions were derived for important special cases and
in cases when instability occurs the occurrence of Hopf bifurcation was investigated giving the
possibility of the birth of limit cycles. The theoretical results have been illustrated by computer
studies.
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